Restricting RICO Under FSIA by Corrigan, John D.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 84 
Number 4 Volume 84, Fall 2010, Number 4 Article 5 
January 2012 
Restricting RICO Under FSIA 
John D. Corrigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Corrigan, John D. (2010) "Restricting RICO Under FSIA," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 84 : No. 4 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol84/iss4/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
CP_Corrigan (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:09 PM 
 
1477 
NOTES 
RESTRICTING RICO UNDER FSIA 
JOHN D. CORRIGAN† 
“There is no more important way to avoid conflict than by 
providing clear norms as to which state can exercise authority 
over whom, and in what circumstances.  Without that allocation 
of competences, all is rancour and chaos.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a foreign financial services company defrauds 
United States investors of millions of dollars via illegal off-
exchange trades of foreign currency futures.  Imagine further 
that the company conspired with officials from a state-owned 
bank in executing the fraud.  This scenario was alleged in Rosner 
v. Bank of China,2 where aggrieved investors sued both the 
company and the bank under the civil provision of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (“RICO”).3  
Fraudulent transactions, such as those alleged in Rosner, often 
give rise to civil RICO claims.  Civil RICO claims are popular 
because successful plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages.4  To 
succeed in a civil RICO claim, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant engaged in an underlying criminal act, such as wire 
fraud.5  This requirement raises a unique issue when the  
 
 
 
† Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S., 2006, University of Rhode Island. I would like to 
thank Professor Pepper for her help and guidance in writing this Note. 
1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW 
WE USE IT 56 (1994). 
2 349 F. App’x 637, 638–39 (2d Cir. 2009). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006). 
4 See Mark H. O’Donoghue, International Decisions: Sovereign Immunity—
Applicability of RICO to Foreign States and State Entities, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 176, 176 
(1991).  
5 See id. at 176–77. 
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defendant, like the Bank of China, is a foreign state or an 
instrumentality thereof:  whether the defendant is immune 
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   
Under the Commerce Clause, the federal government has 
exclusive power to regulate foreign trade.6  Congress has 
exercised this power to regulate suits against foreign sovereigns 
by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(“FSIA” or “Act”).7  FSIA is the only means of suing a foreign 
sovereign in United States courts, and its scope is strictly limited 
to the legislative grant.8  FSIA grants jurisdiction over foreign 
sovereigns in civil claims, but creates a blanket rule of sovereign 
immunity subject only to certain enumerated jurisdictional 
exceptions.9  Because FSIA’s grant is limited to civil claims 
against foreign sovereigns and an underlying criminal act is 
required for a plaintiff to succeed on a civil RICO claim,10 an 
important question arises:  Are foreign sovereigns immune from 
civil RICO claims because they are not subject to jurisdiction for 
the requisite underlying criminal act needed to succeed on a 
RICO claim?   
Despite a global wave of privatization,11 this question arises 
in a number of contexts including advanced-fee fraud,12 investor 
 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
7 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–04 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006 & Supp. II); 
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006 & Supp. II). 
8 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 
(1982); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir. 2002), abrogated on 
other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). 
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
10 See Pieczenik v. Domantis, 120 F. App’x 317, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
11 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 62 (2001). 
12 See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(alleging that the Central Bank of Nigeria participated in advanced-fee fraud in 
violation of RICO statute). The particular type of fraud detailed in Southway and 
Keller, which this Note later contrasts, is known as “Nigerian 419 Fraud”—named 
after the Nigerian Criminal Code section it violates. PAUL BOCIJ, THE DARK SIDE OF 
THE INTERNET: PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY FROM ONLINE CRIMINALS 
100–01 (2006). The scheme is simple: A United States company or individual is sent 
an e-mail requesting urgent assistance in transferring a huge sum of money to the 
United States. See id. at 101. Once the target agrees to help, they are confronted 
with a series of fees or bribes needed to complete the transaction. See id. Lured by 
the promise of outrageous profits, the investors pay the fees until they eventually 
realize the fraud. See id. This type of fraud is most successful when perpetrators 
gather information on the target before contact is initiated. See id. at 102. The FBI 
estimates that in the United States, victims lost between $17 million and $54 
million from 2001 to 2002. Id. at 103.  
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fraud,13 and misappropriation of trade secrets.14  Although courts 
have addressed this question before, no clear trend has emerged 
as to whether the lack of criminal jurisdiction over the foreign 
sovereign defeats the criminal act element in a civil RICO 
claim.15  This Note explores two competing interpretations: 
(1) that so long as the criminal act underlying the civil RICO suit 
falls within a FSIA exception, the sovereign may not raise 
immunity,16 and (2) that absent a grant of criminal jurisdiction, a 
foreign sovereign is not amenable to suit in a civil RICO claim.17  
This Note asserts that the courts should find foreign sovereigns 
immune from civil RICO suits.   
Exploring the two FSIA interpretations requires an 
understanding of both statutes.  To better understand FSIA’s 
framework, Part I discusses the underlying theories of immunity 
that gave rise to its development, as well as the congressional 
intent behind it.  To illustrate civil RICO’s quasi-criminal nature, 
Part I also sketches the development of RICO.  Part II explores 
the two competing interpretations of RICO in light of FSIA by 
detailing two circuit court cases with substantially similar facts 
yet diverging outcomes: Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria18 
and Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria.19  Part II also briefly 
examines the dispositions of other courts on civil RICO claims 
brought under FSIA.  Finally, Part III analyzes the diverging 
arguments in light of the statutory text, case law, international 
law, and policy considerations.  Part III argues that granting 
immunity in civil RICO claims better reconciles FSIA’s text and 
purpose, and better aligns U.S. practice with international law.  
Part III concludes that, in light of policy concerns, courts should 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in 
civil RICO claims. 
 
 
13 See, e.g., Rosner v. Bank of China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(alleging the Bank of China aided a racketeering enterprise centered on foreign 
currency investment fraud).  
14 See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. 838, 840 
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (describing a claim arising from an alleged illegal transfer of trade 
secrets to French-owned copper manufacturer). 
15 See infra Part II. 
16 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1215–16. 
17 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 821. 
18 198 F.3d at 1212–14. 
19 277 F.3d at 814, 821. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AND CIVIL RICO 
A brief overview of both FSIA and RICO provides important 
insight into the underlying issues.  The law in effect before these 
statutes were enacted, both in and outside the United States, 
provides a historical background that is important to 
understanding why Congress enacted these laws and their 
intended application.  Part I.A discusses how absolute and 
restrictive immunity theories shaped United States immunity 
doctrines and presents FSIA’s current framework.  Because of 
civil RICO’s criminal acts requirement, issues arise in applying it 
to foreign sovereigns, who are generally immune from criminal 
prosecution.20  To better understand this issue, Part I.B briefly 
discusses the history of RICO and its quasi-criminal nature. 
A. The Background and Framework of FSIA 
1. The Absolute Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Absolute immunity theory arose from the concept that states 
were of equal standing and thus, did not possess dominion over 
each other.21  This theory was grounded in comity and reciprocity 
concerns22 and dictated that sovereigns were immune from 
jurisdiction absent consent.23  The United States adopted this 
international theory in 1812 in the seminal case of The Schooner 
Exchange v. M’Faddon.24  There, two United States citizens 
sought to reclaim title of a vessel that had been commandeered 
by the French Navy.25  In analyzing France’s claim that the 
United States lacked jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall looked 
 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 220 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2007) (citing The Schooner 
Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812)); HIGGINS, supra note 1, 
at 78–79; Dean Brockbank, The Sovereign Immunity Circle: An Economic Analysis of 
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 2 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1994). 
22 Though short of an “absolute obligation,” comity in the context of 
international law involves a “due regard” for “the legislative, executive, [and] 
judicial acts of [other] nation[s].” See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for 
International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169, 175 (1999–2000); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (9th ed. 2009). 
23 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1215 n.5. 
24 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 133. 
25 See id. at 117. 
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to international law.26  Marshall concluded that “[t]he jurisdiction 
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and 
absolute,” and therefore, a sovereign’s immunity could not be 
disturbed absent consent.27  Because the French Navy had seized 
the vessel in French territorial waters and under color of French 
law, the United States did not have jurisdiction to compel the 
replevin.28  The Schooner Exchange formed the basis of the 
United States common law doctrine of sovereign immunity for 
more than a century.29  Under this doctrine, courts decided 
immunity claims as matters of law and continued to look to 
international law to resolve novel immunity claims.30  Despite 
the foreign relations concerns inherent to immunity decisions, 
courts ignored executive branch views.31  In 1943, however, an 
instance of executive intervention prompted a shift in judicial 
policy that reframed immunity as a political issue.32  
Two cases marked the shift in United States immunity 
doctrine, under which immunity determinations turned on 
foreign relation concerns, rather than the rule of law.  First, in 
Ex parte Republic of Peru, the Court granted immunity to a 
Peruvian government-owned commercial vessel solely because 
the Department of State had formally recognized Peru’s claim of 
immunity.33  The Court explained that wrongs wrought by 
 
26 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 219. 
27 Id. at 220 (quoting The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136). The 
case arose from a libel action brought by United States citizens John McFaddon and 
William Greetham, who asserted title over the Balaou, a French ship of war, in 
United States district court. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117–18. 
McFaddon and Greetham were in fact the original owners of the vessel—then named 
the The Schooner Exchange—which was captured by the French Navy en route to St. 
Sebastian, Spain and converted into a French warship in December of 1810. See id. 
at 117; JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: 
A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 416 (2d ed. 2006). In August of 1811, inclement 
weather forced the Balaou to seek port in Philadelphia, where McFaddon and 
Greetham sued. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117; DUNOFF ET 
AL., supra. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice 
Marshall held that the Court lacked judicial jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. The 
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147. 
28 See id. 
29 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21. 
30 See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 569, 576 (1926) (upholding 
immunity in a commercial claim on international law grounds where an Italian 
government-owned merchant vessel delivered damaged cargo). 
31 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21. 
32 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943). 
33 See id. at 589 (“The certification and the request that the vessel be declared 
immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the 
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friendly sovereigns “are [best] righted through diplomatic 
negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial 
proceedings.”34  Two years later, in the factually similar Republic 
of Mexico v. Hoffman,35 the Court denied Mexico’s immunity 
claim because the Department of State refused to recognize the 
claim.36  In Hoffman, the Court made clear that determinations 
on immunity should come from the executive branch.37  After  
Ex parte Peru and Hoffman, immunity determinations turned  
on Department of State “suggestion[s]” regarding a state’s claim 
of immunity, because the courts considered the suggestions 
binding.38  This politically driven practice, which continued to 
rely on absolute immunity principles, created uncertainty and 
fast became unworkable in the modern world.39  
2. The Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
By the mid-twentieth century, many European states had 
replaced absolute immunity with the so-called “restrictive 
immunity theory.”40  Restrictive immunity gained popularity as 
foreign sovereigns increasingly became involved in commercial 
transactions with private parties, prompting a need to protect 
the private actors in such transactions.41  Under restrictive 
immunity, sovereigns remained immune for public acts, such as 
expropriations, but were not immune for private or commercial 
acts, such as contractual obligations.42   
After World War II, the United States itself became 
increasingly involved in foreign litigation resulting from 
 
political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes 
with the proper conduct of our foreign relations.”). 
34 Id. 
35 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
36 See id. at 35–36. 
37 See id. (“It is . . . not for the courts to deny an immunity which [the Executive 
branch] has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity [where it has not].”). 
38 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 221. 
39 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 419. 
40 See GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND 
PROGNOSTIC VIEW 33 (1984). 
41 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Dep’t of State’s Acting Legal Advisor, to Philip B. 
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 
984–85 (1952) [hereinafter The Tate Letter].  
42 See BADR, supra note 40, at 21–22; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, 
at 221; DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 419. 
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international trade.43  This experience and the rise of state-run 
industries demonstrated the need to protect American parties in 
transactions with foreign state-owned entities.44  Once again, the 
United States looked to international law to shape  
its own doctrine.  In 1952, the Department of State noted the 
growing acceptance of the restrictive immunity doctrine abroad 
and incorporated the theory into its immunity doctrine.45  Though 
nominally guided by restrictive immunity theory, Department of 
State decisions were heavily influenced by political pressures.46  
As a result, implementation of restrictive immunity theory was 
fraught with inconsistency.47  Concerned over the lack of 
uniformity and the friction such decisions caused in international 
relations, Congress sought to shift the decisionmaking process to 
the courts by codifying the restrictive immunity theory under 
FSIA.48   
3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
This Part discusses the congressional objectives behind FSIA 
and describes the framework of the statute.  To resolve 
uniformity and foreign relation concerns, Congress codified 
restrictive immunity under FSIA and shifted responsibility for 
immunity determinations back to the courts.49  Codifying 
restrictive immunity removed political pressures by making 
immunity decisions turn on questions of law.50  Codification also  
 
 
 
aligned United States practice with international practice and 
 
43 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6605 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 219; 
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 419–20. 
44 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43. 
45 See The Tate Letter, supra note 41 (noting that the United States had 
followed a policy of not claiming immunity with respect to claims against publicly 
owned or operated merchant vessels). 
46 See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 222 (“[T]he State Department 
was subjected to diplomatic and political pressures in connection with immunity 
decisions. This produced unpredictable, sometimes unprincipled, results . . . .”). 
47 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6604–06. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. at 6606. 
50 See id. 
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provided more consistent application of restrictive immunity 
theory.51   
To further ensure uniformity, Congress made FSIA the 
exclusive means of suing foreign sovereigns in United States 
courts.52  FSIA grants civil jurisdiction over all suits against 
foreign sovereigns,53 allowing United States citizens to “resolve 
ordinary legal disputes” in United States courts.54  FSIA’s broad 
jurisdictional grant is tempered by a general rule of immunity, 
unless a statutory exception applies.55  Sections 1330 and 1604 of 
Chapter 28 of the United States Code work in concert to achieve 
this effect.  First, § 1330 grants district courts original 
jurisdiction—both subject matter and personal—over any civil 
action against foreign states,56 which may be a “political 
subdivision” and any “agency or instrumentality” of a state.57  
Second, § 1604 grants foreign states immunity from jurisdiction 
unless an enumerated exception applies or an international 
agreement supersedes the statute.58  Under FSIA, sovereigns are 
not entitled to immunity: (1) in terrorism claims,59 (2) when 
immunity is waived,60 (3) in commercial activity claims,61 (4) in 
expropriation claims,62 (5) in property claims,63 (6) in non-
commercial tort claims,64 (7) in wrongful death claims,65 and 
 
51 See id. 
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006). 
53 See id. § 1330. 
54 Gilson v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis 
added) (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Congress was explicit about this purpose: 
We think that it ought to be difficult for defendants engaged in commercial 
activity with substantial American contact . . . to invoke successfully 
sovereign immunity when sued for underlying commercial misdeeds. This 
is especially so in view of the fact that FSIA was written in great measure 
to ensure that our citizens will have access to the courts in order to resolve 
ordinary legal disputes. 
Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
56 Id. § 1330.  
57 Id. § 1603(a). 
58 See id. § 1604. 
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006 Supp. II). 
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II). 
61 See id. § 1605(a)(2). 
62 See id. § 1605(a)(3). 
63 See id. § 1605(a)(4). 
64 See id. § 1605(a)(5). 
65 See id. 
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(8) in counter proceedings brought by the sovereign.66  Aside from 
the amended § 1605A, which provided the terrorism exception,67 
there is no exception to the rule of sovereign immunity for 
criminal acts. 
The most commonly raised exception to immunity, and 
indeed the driving force behind FSIA, is the commercial activity 
exception.68  Plaintiffs raise the commercial activity exception so 
frequently in large part because its definition is so broad.  
Section 1603(d) defines “commercial activity” as either a course of 
conduct or a single transaction that is commercial in character.69  
The “character” of a transaction is “determined by reference to 
[its] nature[,] . . . rather than . . . its purpose.”70  The nature-
purpose distinction is widely criticized as vague and broad.71  
The Supreme Court clarified the definition in Republic of 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.72  There, to protect the integrity of  
its then-faltering economy, Argentina unilaterally deferred 
repayment on bonds it had issued to United States investors.73  
The Court held the nature of bonds was commercial, even though 
Argentina’s motive for deferring repayment was sovereign.74  
Under the Court’s reasoning, an act is commercial “when a 
foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but [as] a 
private player.”75   
According to the Court’s definition, so long as a foreign 
sovereign is acting in a private capacity, it cannot raise 
immunity.  This is true whether the underlying transaction is 
legal or illegal.  Read this way, there is no question that a foreign 
sovereign would be liable for common law fraud arising from a 
contract dispute.  But in a civil RICO suit, a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant was indictable for some underlying criminal 
 
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006). 
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006 Supp. II). 
68 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43. 
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006). 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. 
INT’L L. REV. 51, 61–62 (1992); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 453 cmt. b (1987); BADR, supra note 40, at 
32, 87, 91, 94–96; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of 
Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 222, 224–25 (1951). 
72 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
73 Id. at 609. 
74 Id. at 614, 617. 
75 Id. at 614. 
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act—hence RICO’s quasi-criminal nature.76  FSIA does not 
provide courts with the power to indict—that is, to formally 
charge a sovereign defendant through legal process.77  Indeed, 
such power would be contrary to both United States policy and 
international legal norms.78  If a United States court lacks 
jurisdiction to indict a sovereign defendant, is it competent to 
hear a civil RICO claim brought against one?   
B. The History, Purpose, and Meaning of RICO 
The civil RICO statute subjects defendants to “potentially 
devastating liability.”79  Although it was enacted to combat 
organized crime,80 the statute’s broad scope of prohibitions and 
treble damages provision have incentivized novel and expansive 
civil applications, particularly in the commercial context.81   
1. History and Purpose 
RICO resulted from a lengthy legislative effort to combat 
organized crime.82  The roar of the 1920s heralded the rise of 
organized crime in the United States.83  Prohibition, increased 
narcotics use, and economic depression allowed organized crime 
syndicates to gain a foothold in the American economy.84  
Prohibition in particular incentivized the consolidation of  
 
 
 
 
numerous criminal activities,85 which rendered federal 
 
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). 
77 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 841. 
78 See infra Part III.A. 
79 O’Donoghue, supra note 4, at 178.  
80 See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 
1009, 1013 (1980). 
81 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see, e.g., Rosner v. Bank of China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
82 See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 80. 
83 See Frank D’Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the Outer Limits of 
RICO’s “Affecting Commerce” Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2080 (2008). 
84 Id. 
85 See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 213, 226 (1984). Bradley noted that  
prohibition created a need for large-scale distribution networks comprising 
smugglers, distillers, bottlers, warehouses and trucks as well as numerous 
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prosecution of the discrete underlying crimes less and less 
effective.86 
The legislature responded slowly and incrementally to 
bolster criminal law so that prosecutors could target the 
hierarchy of criminal organizations, rather than the low-level 
criminals who carried out the dirty work.  At first, Congress 
enacted federal kidnapping laws and later, racketeering laws, 
which focused on prosecuting the criminal organizations, rather 
than prosecuting the individual criminals.87  Despite marginal 
success, the need for more effective measures was apparent.88  
Later, as organized crime infected legitimate businesses,89 
Congress shifted focus away from a pure prosecutorial approach 
to include regulatory reforms.90  Notably, civil litigation was seen 
as a potential weapon against organized crime,91 turning citizens 
 
retailing outlets (speakeasies). Obviously this required far more 
organization than did operating a house of prostitution or a bookie joint, 
and organized crime, as we know it today, was born—the unwanted child of 
an unfortunate act of Congress. 
Id. 
86 See Michael Morrissey, Note, Structural Strength: Resolving a Circuit Split in 
Boyle v. United States with a Pragmatic Proof Requirement for RICO Associated-in-
Fact Enterprises, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1943 (2009).  
87 See Bradley, supra note 85, at 229–32. Washington’s first response was the 
Federal Kidnapping Act of 1932, which was passed in response the kidnapping of the 
Lindbergh baby. Id. at 229 & n.106. Despite federalism concerns, legislation in 1934 
expanded the coverage of the Lindbergh Law, prohibiting “interference with 
interstate commerce by [way of] threats, force or violence.” Id. at 231. The effect of 
organized crime on legitimate business was a primary concern of the Kefauver 
Committee of the 1950s and Attorney Generals Kennedy and Katzenbach in the 
1960s. See id. at 236–48. 
88 Id. at 235. 
89 See Morrissey, supra note 86. The Kefauver Committee indentified numerous 
industries that were being purchased with the profits from organized crime, 
including: advertising, amusement, appliances, automobiles, cigarettes, coal, 
communications, steel, and transportation. S. REP. NO. 82-307, at 170–81 (1951). 
Among the concerns was organized crime’s ability “to compete unfairly with 
legitimate” business persons. See S. REP. NO. 81-2370, at 16 (1950). 
90 See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 80, at 1015 n.25. In 1965, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to study the 
problem of organized crime. See D’Angelo, supra note 83. Katzenbach’s commission 
recommended the use of civil litigation and regulatory reforms, as well as traditional 
criminal prosecution, as a means of fighting organized crime. Id. at 2080–81.  
91 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 208 (1967) (“Law enforcement is not 
the only weapon that governments have to control organized crime. Regulatory 
activity can have a great effect.”). 
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into “private attorneys general.”92  Thus, Congress enacted RICO 
and created a civil private right of action whereby victims of 
statutorily proscribed criminal activity could sue in federal court 
for treble damages.93 
2. Interpreting the Civil RICO Statute 
Civil RICO turned victims into private prosecutors by 
creating a private right of action and prescribing treble 
damages.94  To recover in a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant engaged in a “racketeering activity”95—
that is, “any act which is indictable under” state laws and several 
enumerated federal statutes.96  The predicate RICO offenses 
include the ubiquitous 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which criminalizes any 
monetary fraud engaged by wire, radio, or telecommunications.97  
What Congress meant by “indictment” becomes a central issue 
when the defendant is sovereign and immune from indictment.98 
Although Congress expressly instructed courts to liberally 
construe RICO’s provisions to “effectuate its remedial 
purposes,”99 the most natural reading of the civil RICO statute 
indicates that a defendant must be subject to criminal 
prosecution, or  “indictable,” for victims to maintain the suit.  
While there is no requirement that the defendant have actually 
been indicted or convicted, the implication is that the defendant 
must be amenable to the indictment.100  This is clear from the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.101:  The 
predicate offenses are satisfied when the defendant could be 
indicted for an act.102  Logically, it follows that if a court lacks the 
power to indict a defendant, then the defendant cannot be 
indicted and the civil RICO claim must fail.  This logic has been 
 
92 Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 
137 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)). 
93 See id. at 106. 
94 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). 
95 Id. § 1962(b)–(d). 
96 See id. § 1961(1). 
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. II). 
98 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488–89 (1985). 
99 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 
922. 
100 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488 (“[R]acketeering activity consists not of acts for 
which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be.”). 
101 473 U.S. 479.  
102 See id. at 488. 
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used by circuit courts to uniformly bar claims against the federal 
government on the grounds that it is not indictable.103  This same 
rationale has been used to bar claims against state 
legislatures,104 state institutions,105 and municipal 
governments.106  Despite the general consensus that domestic 
sovereigns are not indictable and cannot be subject to a civil 
RICO claim, courts are split when the sovereign is foreign.107 
II. THE COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS OF FSIA IN LIGHT OF CIVIL 
RICO  
Federal courts are divided as to whether or not FSIA grants 
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in civil RICO claims.  Courts 
diverge because RICO requires predicate underlying criminal 
acts and FSIA does not grant criminal jurisdiction or provide any 
exception to the general rule of immunity for criminal acts.  
When examining the conflict, three different contentions emerge.  
First, courts disagree on the scope of FSIA.  While courts agree 
that FSIA does not confer criminal jurisdiction, they are split as 
to whether FSIA’s silence on criminal jurisdiction means that 
§ 1604’s presumption of immunity even applies.108  Second, courts 
disagree as to whether the actor or merely the act itself must be 
“indictable” under RICO.109  Finally, underlying this split is a 
general disagreement over the fundamental concepts of sovereign 
immunity.  
 
103 See, e.g., Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The 
assertion . . . that [a federal agency] was engaged in a RICO conspiracy under 
section 1962(d) was patently defective as a matter of law, since it is self-evident that 
a federal agency is not subject to state or federal criminal prosecution.”); see also 
McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the FDIC not 
indictable for the predicate racketeering activity and thus not amenable to a civil 
RICO suit). 
104 See, e.g., Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n of Ill., 729 F.2d 1128, 
1129–30 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that state legislators are immune from civil 
RICO claims). 
105 See, e.g., Gaines v. Tex. Tech Univ., 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N.D. Tex. 1997) 
(finding that state institutions are immune from civil RICO claims). 
106 See, e.g., Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D. Okla. 
1986) (finding a municipal government incapable of forming the requisite mens rea 
necessary to engage in racketeering activity). 
107 See infra Part II. 
108 Compare Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 2002), with 
Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999). But cf. United 
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 1997). 
109 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1214–15 & n.6. 
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Part II of this Note explores the approaches used by the 
Sixth and Tenth Circuits in addressing the issues inherent to 
civil RICO claims against foreign sovereigns, and briefly 
examines the disposition of other circuits.  Part II.A explores this 
issue in the context of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Southway v. 
Central Bank of Nigeria, which held that FSIA did not render the 
foreign state defendants immune from a civil RICO claim.110  Part 
II.B examines the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Keller v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, which explicitly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s 
rationale.111  Finally, Part II.C examines the disposition of other 
circuits with respect to any conflict between FSIA and RICO. 
A. The Tenth Circuit: Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria 
The Tenth Circuit approaches civil RICO claims against 
foreign sovereigns as if they were any other civil claim.  That is, 
so long as there is an exception to FSIA’s grant of immunity, the 
case may proceed.  One case applying this approach is Southway 
v. Central Bank of Nigeria.  
Southway involved an advanced-fee fraud scheme, whereby 
individuals purporting to represent the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(“CBN”) duped plaintiffs into forwarding them money in the 
hopes of receiving a greater sum in return.112  In November 1995, 
an individual claiming to be a representative of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) contacted an attorney 
in Colorado offering a lucrative deal.113  The purported 
representative claimed that with the attorney’s help, he could 
access a $21 million “over-invoiced” contract that NNPC had 
made with a foreign company.114  Under the proposed agreement, 
the attorney would claim to be a subsidiary of that company and  
 
 
would wire the funds to his own account in the United States.115  
In compensation for his troubles, the attorney “would receive a 
percentage of the funds.”116  
 
110 Id. at 1215. 
111 277 F.3d at 820. 
112 Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 994 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Colo. 1998). 
113 See id. at 1302. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
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The attorney agreed and complied with the representative’s 
instructions to the letter.117  When the attorney sought payment, 
however, additional alleged representatives of both the NNPC 
and the CBN claimed that a series of “advanced fees” were 
necessary to complete the transaction.118  The attorney, “short the 
funds necessary to take full advantage of this opportunity,” 
convinced others to “invest” with him to cover the fees.119  
Unfortunately, the money never materialized.120 
The investors sued in the United States District Court, 
District of Colorado, alleging RICO violations by the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (“FRN”) and the CBN.121  The FRN and CBN 
moved to dismiss, asserting FSIA “did not provide . . . [for] 
jurisdiction over [the] civil RICO claims.”122  The district court 
denied the motion.123   
After the district court denied immunity, the Tenth Circuit, 
on interlocutory appeal, affirmed the district court’s  
holdings that: (1) the alleged fraud fell under the commercial 
activity exception; and (2) FSIA did not preclude civil RICO 
jurisdiction.124  Because the alleged fraud’s nature was 
commercial, the court held that the commercial activity exception 
applied regardless of the underlying illegality.125  The court then 
rejected any specific civil RICO immunity for four reasons.  First, 
the court rejected the argument that Congress intended FSIA to 
govern jurisdiction in criminal matters.126  Because FSIA was 
silent with respect to criminal indictment, the court declined to 
apply its immunity to the predicate RICO offenses.127  The court 
reasoned that it “ha[d] no business attempting to define the scope 
 
117 See id. 
118 Id. at 1303. 
119 Id. at 1303–04. 
120 See id. at 1304. 
121 See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999). 
122 Id. at 1213. 
123 See Southway, 994 F. Supp. at 1309. 
124 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1214. On remand, the court discovered that the 
sovereign defendants had not in fact participated in the fraud and thus dismissed 
the case against them. See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 328 F.3d 1267, 1273–74 
(10th Cir. 2003). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal but made clear that there 
was no immunity because the cause of action arose from a RICO violation. See id. at 
1274. 
125 See Southway, 198 F.3d at 1217–18. 
126 See id. at 1214. 
127 See id. at 1215 n.4. 
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of foreign sovereign immunity in the first instance,”128 and that if 
Congress wished for foreign sovereigns to be immune from 
criminal indictment, Congress would have expressly provided 
such an immunity.129  Second, the court declined to distinguish 
RICO from other civil claims, despite RICO’s unique 
requirements.130  Third, the court found that jurisdiction was 
consistent with Congress’s purpose in codifying the restrictive 
theory of immunity in FSIA.131  The court distinguished foreign 
sovereign immunity from domestic sovereign immunity, 
reasoning that the law had abandoned absolute immunity for 
foreign sovereigns with the adoption of the Tate Letter.132  
Finally, the court held that in any event, the predicate RICO 
offense itself must be indictable, not the party that committed 
it.133  Accordingly, the court denied immunity to the FRN and 
CBN. 
After the court remanded the case for further proceedings, 
the FRN and CBN were able to demonstrate at trial that 
although all communications appeared to be official, they were in 
fact sent from imposters.134 
B. The Sixth Circuit: Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria 
The Sixth Circuit’s approach to resolving the civil RICO 
immunity question is diametrically opposed to the Tenth 
Circuit’s approach.  The Sixth Circuit considers FSIA’s failure to 
provide for criminal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns to mean 
that such sovereigns are not indictable for RICO’s predicate 
criminal acts and thus, are immune from civil RICO suits.  An 
example of this approach can be seen in Keller v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria. 
The facts underlying Keller mirror those of Southway.  
There, a purported Nigerian official called a sales representative 
for a Michigan-based manufacturer of mobile medical centers.135  
The official offered the deal of a lifetime:  In exchange for 
 
128 Id. at 1214–15 (citing Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d 
Cir. 1988)). 
129 See id. at 1215. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. at 1216. 
132 See id. at 1215 n.5. 
133 See id. at 1215 & n.6. 
134 See Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 328 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003). 
135 See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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exclusive distribution rights of the mobile medical centers, the 
official would pay the manufacturer $6.63 million for $4.10 
million worth of equipment and a $7.65 million licensing fee.136  
The official promised that the Nigerian government had already 
appropriated the funds137 and that the manufacturer only needed 
to establish an escrow account in the United States from which 
the funds would be disbursed.138  After they struck the deal, the 
manufacturer established the escrow account and waited.139   
When the funds did not materialize, various individuals 
purporting to hold positions within the CBN and the  
FRN demanded “advanced fees” from the manufacturer.140  
Reluctantly, the manufacturer paid a series of fees totaling 
approximately $30,000.141  Each time the manufacturer paid one 
fee, the officials demanded another and postponed the transfer.142  
Eventually, a purported official told the manufacturer that the 
funds were ready, but that the manufacturer had to personally 
collect the funds in London, England.143  Undaunted by the string 
of dubious fees and broken promises, the manufacturer travelled 
to London only to find that the promised courier never 
appeared.144  Finally realizing the fraud, the manufacturer sued 
under civil RICO in federal district court.145   
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
denial of CBN’s immunity.146  Like the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth 
Circuit held that allegations of criminal activity did not rob the 
transaction of its commercial nature and thus, the commercial 
activity exception applied;147 however, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis 
did not end there and was markedly different in three ways.  
First, the Sixth Circuit read FSIA’s silence on criminal 
jurisdiction as an indication that Congress did not intend to 
provide for it—that is, a foreign sovereign could not be indicted 
 
136 See id.  
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See Final Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at *6, Keller, 277 F.3d 811 (No. 00-
3369), 2000 WL 35555622. 
140 See id. at *7. 
141 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 814. 
142 See Final Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 139, at *6–7. 
143 See id. at *7. 
144 See id.  
145 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 814. 
146 See id. at 818. 
147 See id. at 816. 
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under FSIA.148  The Sixth Circuit recognized that its jurisdiction 
was limited to “the exact degrees and character 
which . . . Congress [had granted].”149  Because Congress did not 
provide for criminal jurisdiction in the only relevant statute, the 
court could not exercise jurisdiction over a claim that required 
it.150 
Second, because FSIA’s provisions were “[s]ubject to existing 
international agreements,” foreign sovereigns were immune from 
criminal prosecution absent a contrary international 
agreement.151  The court noted that bringing a criminal 
proceeding against another nation during peacetime runs counter 
to United States policy.152  Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
argument that any distinction between indictable acts and 
indictable actors was material.153  Relying on its own precedent, 
the court determined that the actor and not the act “count[ed] for 
the purposes of RICO ‘indictability.’ ”154  Thus, since civil RICO 
required the defendant to be indictable and because sovereigns 
could not be indicted in United States courts, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that sovereigns must be immune.155 
 
148 See id. at 820.  
149 Id. (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 433 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 See id.; see also Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 436 (holding in the context of the 
Alien Tort Statute, FSIA immunity is granted in cases involving alleged violations of 
international law not enumerated in FSIA’s exceptions); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (“Jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts is . . . limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory 
grant.”). 
151 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Congress specifically omitted the term “future” 
international agreements because it was deemed “misleading.” HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 43, at 6608. Congress used the term “existing” to ensure that courts 
would understand that the Act did not supersede any treaties. Id. Congress intended 
for all treaties, both those in existence in 1976 and those to come, to control in case 
of conflict. See id. at 1616. 
152 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 819–20 (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & 
Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. 838, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
153 See id. at 820–21. 
154 Id. (citing Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991)); Sedima 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985) (“[R]ackeetering activity consists not 
of acts for which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be.” 
(emphasis added)). But see S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 (1969) (“[The] ‘racketeering 
activity’ . . . must be an act in itself subject to criminal sanction . . . .”). 
155 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 821. 
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C. Other Circuits 
Although only the Southway and Keller courts have framed 
the issue in terms of indictment, other circuits have entertained 
civil RICO claims against foreign sovereigns.  The Second,156 
Eleventh,157 and Federal Circuits158 have all held that the courts 
may exercise jurisdiction under FSIA in civil RICO claims 
against foreign sovereigns if the commercial activity exception 
applies.  The Seventh Circuit has never spoken on the issue, but 
one of its district courts has declined to recognize a civil RICO 
immunity rule.159  The Fifth Circuit has held that entities not  
 
 
 
subject to indictment are immune from civil RICO jurisdiction160 
 
156 See Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that foreign sovereigns were presumptively immune unless an exception 
applied, but that commercial activity outside the U.S. with no “direct effect” on the 
U.S. did not satisfy the commercial activity exception); see also Rosner v. Bank of 
China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419, 424, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the alleged 
activity fell within commercial activity exception of FSIA, but that it did not amount 
to a RICO violation); Daly v. Castro Llanes, 30 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (dismissing a civil RICO action against a foreign bank for failing to plead with 
particularity). 
157 See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the FSIA does not address immunity in the criminal context, and any immunity 
must be determined from the principles of The Schooner Exchange); see also United 
States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758, 2007 WL 2002452, at *14 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2007) 
(recognizing that Eleventh Circuit precedent bound the court from entertaining the 
argument for RICO immunity under the FSIA). 
158 See Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 503 F. Supp. 2d 267, 274 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the commercial activity exception applied and the court 
would have jurisdiction but for the fact that the civil RICO claims were time barred). 
But cf. Pieczenik v. Domantis, 120 F. App’x 317, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that 
federal agencies could not be sued under RICO because they are not “person[s] 
capable of violating RICO[,] . . . [they] are not subject to . . . criminal prosecution,” 
and they cannot satisfy the predicate acts (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
159 See Am. Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 653 F. 
Supp. 861, 863–64 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
160 See McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the 
FDIC is not indictable for the predicate racketeering activity and thus not amenable 
to a civil RICO suit); see also St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 
447 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Where persons associate ‘in fact’ for criminal purposes, [ ] each 
person may be held liable under RICO for his [part] . . . but the association itself 
cannot be.” (quoting Haroco v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th 
Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)) (citation omitted)). 
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and affirmed portions of a district court holding extending that 
rationale to foreign sovereigns.161   
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN 
KELLER 
This Note urges courts to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s analysis 
in Keller and grant foreign sovereigns immunity in civil RICO 
claims because FSIA does not empower the courts to indict the 
sovereigns for RICO’s predicate criminal acts.  Three major 
considerations favor this broad grant of immunity under FSIA: 
reconciliation of statutory construction with congressional intent, 
alignment with international practice, and reduction of 
transaction costs in commercial dealings with sovereigns. 
A. Statutory Construction 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning better reconciles the language 
of FSIA with the underlying purposes of codifying restrictive 
immunity and properly considers RICO a crime fighting statute.  
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Southway, however, raises 
important points that must be addressed prior to accepting the 
Keller analysis. 
First, while FSIA’s silence on criminal jurisdiction raises 
doubts that Congress intended for FSIA immunity to apply to 
foreign sovereigns in criminal cases, granting immunity in such 
cases is more consistent with FSIA’s blanket immunity rule and 
underlying purpose.  FSIA is the only means by which United 
States citizens may sue foreign sovereigns in a United States 
court.162  FSIA grants civil jurisdiction but not criminal 
jurisdiction; this exclusion is a signal that FSIA does not give the 
courts power to indict foreign sovereigns.163  If courts cannot 
 
161 See Dale v. Colagiovanni, 337 F. Supp. 2d 825, 842–43 (S.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d 
in part, 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that because the Vatican was not 
indictable for the predicate RICO acts under FSIA, it could not be sued under civil 
RICO). 
162 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 
(1982) (limiting the court’s jurisdiction to “subjects encompassed within a statutory 
grant of jurisdiction”); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
163 Expressio unis est exclusio alterius. Burke v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 672, 
678 (M.D. Ala. 1997); see United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) 
(“[E]xpressing one item of a[n] . . . associated group or series excludes another left 
unmentioned . . . .”). 
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indict foreign sovereigns, then logically, foreign sovereigns are 
immune from criminal jurisdiction under FSIA.  Now some 
courts, notably the Eleventh164 and Second165 Circuits, have 
argued that FSIA’s silence on criminal jurisdiction does not 
prohibit criminal indictment under common law doctrines.  But 
this argument does apply to FSIA claims brought by private 
citizens because FSIA is the sole means for private citizens to sue 
foreign sovereigns, rendering common law doctrines ineffective.166  
Moreover, if FSIA’s immunity does not extend to cover criminal 
acts, then why did Congress amend FSIA to remove immunity for 
cases arising from terrorism?167  Not coincidentally, the very acts 
covered under § 1605A—torture, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking or state sponsorship thereof168—are prohibited under 
RICO’s § 1961.169  In light of the terrorism amendment, the 
exclusion of any specific fraud immunity exception and FSIA’s 
deafening silence on criminal jurisdiction suggest that courts 
should render sovereigns immune in civil RICO claims not falling 
under § 1605A.  
Second, while RICO’s language speaks of indictable “acts” 
and not “actors,” relevant precedent suggests that the court must 
be able to indict the actor to satisfy the “predicate criminal acts” 
element.  The Supreme Court made clear in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex Co.170 that while civil RICO does not require that the 
defendant have been convicted of the underlying act, it does 
require an indictable act.171  As shown in Part I.B, the circuit 
courts have followed this logic to bar civil RICO claims against 
 
164 See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“Because the FSIA [does not] address[ ] . . . foreign sovereign immunity in the 
criminal context, [it] . . . could [only] attach . . . pursuant to the principles and 
procedures outlined in The Schooner Exchange and its progeny.”).  
165 See, e.g., Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(declining to apply FSIA to resolve a head-of-state immunity issue). 
166 See Keller, 277 F.3d at 819; see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 701. 
167 The jurisdictional basis for prosecution of such crimes is often called 
“universal jurisdiction.” DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 380–83. Universal 
jurisdiction allows any court to hear a claim against any defendant that has violated 
the so-called “law of nations.” See id. at 380–82. What constitutes such a violation is 
hotly debated and beyond the scope of this Note, but certainly includes piracy, war 
crimes, and genocide. Id. at 380. 
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2006 Supp. II). 
169 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining racketeering activity as “any act or 
threat involving murder[ or] kidnapping”). 
170 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
171 Id. at 488. 
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the United States government, our domestic sovereign.172  For 
example, the Sixth Circuit in Berger v. Pierce173 held that civil 
RICO claims against federal agencies were “defective as a matter 
of law” because federal agencies were not indictable.174  While the 
Tenth Circuit agreed with the Berger Court, it distinguished 
between the immunity available to domestic sovereigns, absolute 
immunity, and the immunity available to foreign sovereigns, 
restrictive immunity.175  This argument ignores restrictive 
immunity theory, as codified by FSIA, which has never 
contemplated criminal prosecutions against foreign sovereigns.  
Restrictive immunity arose to provide redress to private parties 
when commercial transactions with foreign sovereigns soured,176 
and no court has used restrictive immunity theory to justify 
criminal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.   
Third, although the conduct in both Southway and Keller is 
properly described as commercial in nature, immunity should not 
be excepted in civil RICO claims, which is not the type of relief 
contemplated by FSIA.  FSIA codified the restrictive immunity 
theory to regulate foreign commerce by protecting private parties 
in transactions with foreign sovereigns.177  Congress protected 
private parties by giving them access to United States courts to 
“resolve ordinary legal disputes.”178  But with civil RICO, 
ordinary protection crosses the line into private prosecution.  
RICO’s unique history and its design as a crime-fighting tool 
 
172 See McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the 
FDIC is not indictable); Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding 
“that a federal agency is not subject to state or federal criminal prosecution”). 
173 933 F.2d 393. 
174 See id. at 397; see also McNeily, 6 F.3d at 350 (finding the FDIC is not 
indictable and thus cannot engage in a “racketeering activity”). But c.f. Republic of 
Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming jurisdiction in civil 
RICO claims against the deposed President of the Philippines without discussing the 
indictment issue); Am. Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 
653 F. Supp. 861, 863–64 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (exercising jurisdiction in a civil RICO 
claim against an instrumentality of the French government without addressing the 
indictment issue). 
175 See Southway, 198 F.3d 1210, 1215 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999).  
176 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605–06. 
177 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983) (“Congress 
expressly exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce.”); see also 
Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1001 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (“The purpose of the FSIA is to facilitate suits in United States courts 
arising from the commercial conduct of foreign sovereigns.”). 
178 Gilson v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43) (emphasis added). 
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makes it far from ordinary.179  It seems unlikely that Congress 
intended to empower individuals to serve as “private attorneys 
general”180 against foreign sovereigns.  Such intent would run 
counter to international understandings of restrictive immunity, 
which were codified in the Act.181  Given this unique nature, it is 
unlikely that RICO was within congressional contemplation 
when the drafters included the terms “any nonjury civil 
action.”182   
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of FSIA is 
inconsistent with the Act’s underlying purpose.  Accordingly, 
statutory analysis suggests that the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation better reconciles FSIA’s text with its purpose and 
should be adopted by courts.   
B. Alignment with International Law 
The Sixth Circuit’s narrow reading of FSIA’s jurisdictional 
grant would better align United States practice with 
international immunity practices.  The United States has always 
looked to international practice to shape its own immunity 
doctrines; FSIA is no different.183  Indeed, using international law 
to temper the “reach of statutes is firmly established in United 
States jurisprudence.”184  Up until this point, this Note has 
 
179 See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 80, at 1013–14. 
180 Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 
137 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)). 
181 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43. 
182 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006). 
183 See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–38 
(1812); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6606 (following international law in 
codifying the FSIA). 
184 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial 
reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence.”). Although Justice 
Scalia argues in the context of the Sherman Act, this argument applies equally well 
to RICO, where extension of the statute’s reach has foreign relations consequences. 
Justice Scalia derived this argument from maritime law, where foreign relations 
concerns are also prevalent. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 
U.S. 354, 359–60 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953) (“[Resolving] 
to apply [The Jones Act] only to areas and transactions in which American law 
would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law.”); see 
also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21–22, 
(1963) (applying the Charming Betsy canon to restrict application of National Labor 
Relations Act to foreign-flag vessels). This same logic has been applied to construe 
statutes in light of international law in various other contexts. See, e.g., Sale v. 
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argued that courts lack jurisdiction—the “power to 
adjudicate”185—over criminal or quasi-criminal claims against 
foreign sovereigns.  There is, however, another relevant type of 
jurisdiction, so-called “legislative jurisdiction”—the power to 
prescribe.186  As is the case here, where the extent of 
congressional authority is broad,187 the relevant inquiry is not 
whether Congress has power to extend RICO over foreign 
sovereigns via FSIA, but whether it has elected to do so.188  This 
inquiry considers the relationship of a statute to international 
law and is guided by two canons.189   
First, the Charming Betsy cannon states that “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate [customary 
international law] if any [alternative] construction remains.”190  
Put simply, statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with 
customary international law if it can be avoided.  While there is 
no consensus within the international community on the 
particulars of a state’s jurisdictional limits,191 it is well-accepted 
that unilaterally imposing criminal liability on sovereign 
defendants violates international law.192  Rather, criminal 
proceedings against sovereigns or their officials must be brought 
before international criminal courts or ad hoc international 
 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178 n.35 (1993); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 
U.S. 25, 32 (1982). 
185 See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813. 
186 Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 401(a) (1987). 
187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has broad power to regulate foreign 
commerce. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620–22 (1927); United States v. 
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 
347, 357 (1909). 
188 See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814. 
189 See id. Ordinarily there is a third relevant canon, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, which presumes that Congress means for its statutes to apply 
only within the United States, unless a contrary intent is evident. See id. at 817. 
This canon is inapplicable where United States law is the operative law, as was the 
case in Southway and Keller. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 382–83. 
190 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  
191 See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” out of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 
YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 498–99 (1992) (arguing that the international norms that 
structure relations, that is “jurisdiction and competence,” are ill-defined and no well-
accepted doctrine exists). 
192 See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (holding that Belgium’s issuance of international 
arrest warrants against Congo’s incumbent foreign minister violated international 
law).  
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tribunals.193  Applying the Charming Betsy cannon:  Since, 
unilateral criminal sanctions against foreign sovereigns are 
prohibited by customary international law, courts should 
presume that FSIA does not provide for criminal jurisdiction 
against sovereigns and that sovereigns are immune from civil 
RICO claims because of their quasi-criminal nature.   
Second, international comity concerns temper legislative 
jurisdictional reach.  In interpreting statutes with 
extraterritorial reach, courts should assume that comity concerns 
have been incorporated by the legislature in drafting the laws.194  
Comity involves “the respect . . . nations afford each other by 
limiting the reach of their laws.”195  When determining the 
extraterritorial reach of a statute, courts should assume that 
Congress did not intend to interfere with the actions of another 
nation.  Hailing a sovereign to court for a civil matter is itself 
disruptive, but it is tolerated as a cost of doing business.196  
Imposing criminal liability on another sovereign, however, 
impermissibly interferes with the actions of another nation.197  
Thus, courts should assume that Congress did not intend to 
extend RICO to foreign sovereigns through FSIA.   
Moreover, bringing criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings 
against foreign sovereigns can embarrass the executive branch 
and even result in reciprocal treatment abroad.198  Finally, the 
United States does not bring criminal proceedings against 
foreign states in peacetime situations.199  Because the policy 
implications of indicting a sovereign are significant,200 the 
 
193 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 53–54 (May 31, 2004), available at http:www.scsl. 
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7OeBn4RulEg=&tabid=191. 
194 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578–79 & n.7 (1953); Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609–10 (9th Cir. 1976). 
195 See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
196 See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 18. 
197 See, e.g., Taylor, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (holding that Belgium’s issuance of 
international arrest warrants against Congo’s incumbent foreign minister violated 
international law). 
198 See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); see also Donoghue, 
supra note 191, at 521. Reciprocity implications shaped the Department of State’s 
understanding of restrictive immunity. Id. at 521 n.170. 
199 See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F. Supp. at 844 (N.D. 
Ohio 1990). 
200 See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588–89. 
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decision to extend or curtail the extraterritorial reach of United 
States criminal law should not be made by the judicial branch. 
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis would run contrary to 
international law.  The Sixth Circuit’s analysis better aligns 
United States practice with international law and should be 
adopted by courts. 
C. Reduction of Economic Costs 
Finally, while the Tenth Circuit’s analysis provides the 
greatest level of protection to private parties, it creates 
uncertainties that destabilize the market.  The Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis creates more stability by better balancing the interests 
of both private and sovereign parties.  Some commentators call 
for abandoning the concepts of immunity altogether, in favor of 
fostering a contractarian-business climate.  Those commentators 
argue that “[t]he elimination of immunity promotes the security 
of contract and minimizes disruption in the normal rules of the 
marketplace, and thus furthers more broadly the interests of the 
U.S. economic and political system.”201  Though not without 
merit, such arguments ignore political realities.  Of course, 
denying redress entirely would “stifl[e] . . . international 
commerce”202 and would ignore the underlying purpose of 
restrictive immunity.203  But subjecting foreign sovereigns to 
quasi-criminal actions would have deleterious effects, as 
sovereigns would be wary of attracting United States 
investments.  Exempting foreign sovereigns from civil RICO 
liability does not rob transaction partners of judicial protection.204  
Rather, ordinary remedies are available under FSIA, and only 
those with unclean hands are barred redress in common law 
fraud;205 thus, plaintiffs who are complicit in the fraud would 
rightly be denied relief.  Furthermore, foreign sovereigns are not 
afforded the same insolvency protections as United States 
citizens,206 and as such, restricting plaintiffs to ordinary litigation 
is not so unjust.   
 
201 Donoghue, supra note 191, at 521. 
202 See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 11. 
203 See id. at 18. 
204 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 6605–06. 
205 See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002). 
206 Jeremy Ostrander, Note, The Last Bastion of Sovereign Immunity: A 
Comparative Look at Immunity from Execution of Judgments, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 541, 574 (2004). 
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Finally, if private parties desire more protection than that 
afforded by traditional litigation other than civil RICO, they can 
bargain for a FSIA immunity waiver.207  While private citizens, 
even corporate ones, do not always posses the same bargaining 
power as foreign sovereigns,208 unequal bargaining power does 
not entitle them to act as “private attorneys general”209 against 
foreign sovereigns.  Certainty and predictability in the law would 
help lower transactional costs, as both parties could comfortably 
rely on the integrity of agreements without fear of quasi-criminal 
reprisal.  The current lack of uniformity in the judiciary’s 
application of FSIA undermines stability;210 however, allowing 
private citizens to prosecute foreign sovereigns would not rectify 
the situation.  Because the Sixth Circuit’s analysis better 
balances the concerns of both private and public parties, it 
creates greater stability and certainty. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis offers several advantages over 
the Tenth Circuit’s.  Granting foreign sovereigns immunity in 
civil RICO claims reconciles FSIA’s text with its purpose, aligns 
United States practice with international law, and lowers 
transaction costs between private parties and sovereigns. 
Although privatization may one day render immunity 
questions moot, that day is a long way off.  A uniform approach 
to immunity is essential to lowering transaction costs and 
increasing foreign trade.  Any decision to extend or curtail 
jurisdiction in criminal or quasi-criminal matters is best left to 
the political branches because of the foreign relations concerns 
involved. 
 
 
207 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II). 
208 See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 21. 
209 Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 
137 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)). 
210 See Brockbank, supra note 21, at 20. 
